

## IS THE EU HISTORIC MISSION STILL ALIVE OR ACHIEVED? CASE OF KOSOVO AND SERBIA

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### **Abstract:**

The cessation of hostilities between western European countries after the Second World War had become the main preoccupation of European leaders. Bored with wars and hostilities, they decided to integrate their economic sectors by establishing the common economic area respectively establishing the European Community. Indeed, the present article tends to argue that the European Union historic mission to end hostilities between nations/neighbouring countries by economic integration is still alive in the case of western Balkan countries. In order to argue such hypothesis, a comparing approach between the historical and current relationship between Kosovo and Serbia in one side and relationship between France and Germany before the existence of the European Union and after, is applied, which comparison proves that the historic mission of the European Union is still alive and will remain for Western Balkan countries until all of them become members of the European Union.

*Keywords: European Integration, Yugoslavia, Western Balkan countries, historical relationship between Kosovo and EU, EU historical mission*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Before the creation of the European Union (EU), Europe's history was characterized with frequent and bloody wars. There were three consecutive wars between Germany and France only between one generation: 1870 to 1945 (E. Héréditaire, 2008). Leaders of both countries have brought their people in a desperate way, causing loss of lives and huge economic losses. They incited the death of about 400 000 French soldiers and 350 000 German soldiers and thousands of French civilians only at the end of the First World War (H.Yahya, 2006). Different from World War I, World War II caused not disastrous consequences only for both European people, but also for other nations. Indeed, the two World Wars together caused the death of over 55 million people, immeasurable ruins and countless wounded and disabled (M. Spivak, 1992, pp. 174-176). Half of the victims were undefended children, women and elderly. (H.Yahya,2006). The lives of survived persons became empty. They lost their family members and their economic assets. The European economy was completely devastated. As result, the Europe of 1945 'no longer counted militarily or economically, or politically' (L. Clergerie, A. Gruber & P. Rambaud, 2016, p.25).

European politicians, who were faced with this miserable situation, sixteen years later, realized that the future of their people cannot be built by war. They also realized that the EU is the most appropriate way of building lasting peace between their countries. They launched the idea that recovery of Europe must begin first by economic cooperation to continue then with political cooperation. The reason behind was that only the economic and political cooperation will disable a new civil war in Europe. The first concrete idea on the future of Europe was that of the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who was convinced that European states must create a sort of "United States" of Europe (N. Moussis, 2006, p.5). Nevertheless, the first concrete idea for Europe as it is now, was launched by Jean Monnet, who gave an essential contribution to the project of creation of a united Europe. The same project was declared and later presented to the French government by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of France, Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950. This was the plan that went into EU history, known as the Schuman Plan. The same plan was immediately supported by the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer and Prime Ministers of Italy and Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg (BENELUX three countries). After a year of negotiations, they signed the same plan in the form of a Treaty, known as the Treaty of the European Community for Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in Paris on 18 April 1951. This is the date that marks the early history of the united Europe or the EU of today.

Indeed, the aim of this article is not to deepen in the EU's history, but rather to emphasize that the EU's historic mission is still alive and has not been achieved fully yet. This mission is especially vivid in the case of Western Balkan countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania) of which some are EU member states and some want to become members one day.

All these countries like EU founding countries during the two World Wars were involved in the bloody war in the former Yugoslavia, except Albania. As consequence, there have been thousands of lives lost and billions of losses in the economy. Moreover, this war did aggravate the relationship between the people of these countries. And this is why, they see their future in the EU because their accession to the EU, would allow them to cooperate and create a lasting peace between them. One such example is the case of the Republic of Kosovo, which case is the subject of this article. Even though the war between the Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is over, and the Republic of Kosovo became independent since 17<sup>th</sup> of February 2008, relations between the two countries remained almost unchangeable, because Serbia does not accept the reality created in Kosovo. Improvement of relations and the termination of hostilities between the people of both countries can happen only through cooperation and integration in the EU structures.

To prove this hypothesis and make a clearer link between the case of the EU's founding countries (France and Germany) and the case of Kosovo with Serbia, it is necessary to go back to the history of the former Yugoslavia, its relations with EC / EU, and its dissolution. All the arguments are build based on the scholars, research and cases from practice.

## 2. THE HISTORICAL MILESTONES ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1918-1980)

## 2.1. First Yugoslavia Monarchist

Among other consequences, the end of the First World War through the Treaty of Versailles, created two states that did not exist before. One of these two new states was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which later became the United Kingdom of the Yugoslavia. Before moving further on this issue, the meaning or origin of the term "Yugoslavia", should be clarified before as it has only brought misfortune for most people who lived in that Yugoslavia, especially for Kosovo Albanians. The term "Yugoslavia" literally means Slave of the South, although the idea "Yugoslav" was born among the Croats and Slovenes (Larouse). Indeed, it was the Croatian Josip Juraj Strossmayer who used the term "Yugoslav" for the first time in the 1860s.

At the same time, Josip Juraj Strossmayer was also one of the main defendants of *Yugoslavism* in the nineteenth century. It was him and other Croatian and Slovenian colleagues, who wanted to rebuild their lives in the Slavic family by inventing Yugoslavia (B.Feron, 1999, p.24-25). Even though Serbian politicians had a tight vision and conception of South Slave unity completely different to that of the Croats, a political agreement was signed between Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918, on creating a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. At the head of this Kingdom became the king of the Kingdom of Serbia, Pierre 1st. This new state included the territories as follows (with an area of 247,542 km<sup>2</sup>):

- *the Kingdom of Serbia, which includes the territory of Macedonia and Kosovo (in 1912, when the Ottoman Empire was in decline, the Serbs turned against Bulgaria and occupied Kosovo (CIJ no.15678, 2009) and Macedonia);*
- *the Kingdom of Montenegro;*
- *Vojvodina;*
- *the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina;*
- *Croatia and Slovenia.*

The question that arises is whether the Slovenes and Croats achieved to create the state that they wanted after the First World War? The answer is of course, negative. Indeed, this new Slavic state was created, but there were a lot of things for which its founders did not agree at the time of creation. Slovenia was not satisfied with the manner of its representation on the Yugoslav Committee, because its representation on the committee was low. Then the return for the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, provided that the new state will be "a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy", but it said nothing on the matter if the South Slavs will be unified by a centralized state or federal (B.Feron, 1999, p.24). In addition, it was decided under the patronage of King Peter 1st, that the constitution of Serbia will be applied until the moment when the Basic Law on the newly created state, be approved. As Charles Rivet said, "This time we can see that the "Serbian idea exceeds the Yugoslav idea" (C. Rivet, 2000). From that point, there were even some signs that this new union will not have a long life and there will be a lot of problems.

However, the evil does not stop here. Tragedy happens when a Montenegrin deputy in full session of Parliament, kills one of the Croat deputies, Stjepan Radic. This criminal act took place in 1928, during the time when King Alexander 1st (he became king after the death of his father in 1921) had proclaimed his personal dictatorship or "Serbian dictatorship" as the Croats say (B. Feron, 1999, p.24).

After this tragedy, King Alexander 1st decided to rename the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (October 3, 1929), and create a new Yugoslav nation. However, the main intention of King Alexander 1st was rather disappearance of the old nations to create this new artificial Yugoslav nation, as Gregory Proche did observed too. According to him, King Alexander 1st who wanted to create such a nation by force was to remove the Croatian, Bosnian, Slovenian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Albanian identities. He said the project was that these ancient nations become first Yugoslavs and then 'christened' in Serbian, becoming Orthodox (G. Peroche, 2003). King Alexander 1<sup>st</sup> does not stop here. After changing the name, he made other changes that will install a deeper discrimination between nations. To prove this, it is sufficient to simply refer to some statistics on the representation of nations in the institutions mandated with the most important public functions of Yugoslav Kingdom:

**Figure1:** Representation of nations in institutions or in the most important public functions of Yugoslav Kingdom:

Services	Total Number of People	Serbs	Croats	Slovenes
Military forces	1 508	1 308	140	50
Civil servants of Royal Houses	31*	30		
Ministry of Internal Affairs	135*	127		
Ministry of Justice	137*	116		
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	219	180	39	-----

Source: The source of figures: Bernard Feron, 'Yugoslavia source of conflict', The World-Edition, France 1993, pp. 28.

These figure shows that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was not a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes but 'only Serbs.' In this context, it should be mentioned that at that time, Kosovo Albanians were not only part of the institutions, and they have not even been considered as a nation. Such discrimination was confirmed by the father of the EU, Robert Schuman. In 1934, when Robert Schuman presented his report to the French Parliament, he said that "all the functions of the State, more important, were reserved to the Serbs" (G. Porche, 2003, p.5). But this discriminatory regime did not survive for long. Seeing this situation, Croats begin to work with the external enemies of the former Yugoslavia. Then, in October 9, 1934, King Alexander was assassinated by a representative of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, Vlado Ćernozemski. After the death of King Alexander 1, the United Yugoslavia continues to exist only for a period of seven years as World War II had begun. In April 1941, the United Yugoslavia or the first Yugoslavia capitulated, when Belgrade was attacked by German forces.

The Second World War divided the territory of the former Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) in four parts (M. Roux, 1992). Thus, the north of Slovenia was divided between Germany, Italy and Hungary. Croatia became an independent state which included Bosnia and Herzegovina, under which Dalmatia was annexed to Italy, while Serbia became under the control of Germany, but the part of Vojvodina (with a population of majority Magyar) was separated between Hungary and Germany. Kosovo and parts of Macedonia were annexed to Albania which was under the control of Italy. The other part of Macedonia was taken by the Bulgarians, whereas Montenegro became independent but under the Italian occupation. In this context, it is important to answer the following question: What happened to these territories later? In fact, a precise response to this question will be the subject of the following paragraph.

## 2.2. The second Federative Yugoslavia under Tito's regime

In 1945, World War II ended and as a result, Josip Broz Tito (hereinafter Tito), the leader of a Croatian communist movement, became a national hero. Tito, supported by the Soviet Red Army, managed to liberate Serbia (1944), Croatia and other countries (1945). For this reason, he had managed to win 90% of votes during the elections of November 1945. The same month, November 29, 1945, he achieved to formally abolish the first monarchist Yugoslavia, and proclaimed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Like the King Alexander 1st, Tito decided to change the name of the federation. Thus, from 1963, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is renamed as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). SFRY consisted of six republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia) and two 'autonomous regions' that later became 'autonomous provinces' (Kosovo and Vojvodina). Tito's (who was mid-Slovenian origin, half-Croatian,) communist regime is considered to be different from the system of the first Yugoslavia. SFRY under the Tito's regime was characterized as the country of the unification of people (P. Ville la-Petit, 2003). In addition, the Yugoslav communist regime is considered different from that in Russia and China. It is considered the only "method" of communism that really worked. However, was Tito's regime what he had actually wanted it to be?

At the beginning of 1945-1950, there were tensions between supporters and opponents of the communist party like in other communist countries. There were 260,000 hasty executions, 775,000 people were tortured (S. Courtois, 2002, p.128-129), and repression against Kosovo Albanians that caused about 50 000 deaths (S. Metais, 2006), mostly by the state of Serbia. This disaster happened only during the first year of Tito's power. But a year later, on January 31, 1946, the first constitution of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FLRY) was adopted (Constitution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946). By this constitution, the six republics getting their autonomy in terms of language and administrative staff, although the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo (with Albanian majority) and Vojvodina (highly populated with Hungarian) remained as the two regions / autonomous

provinces of Serbia *within* the federal state of Yugoslavia. Both provinces did not remain as a part of Serbia but in this part of the former Yugoslavia. In the wake of these changes, a great injustice was done to Kosovo Albanians. They obtained the status of "minority" status instead of "nation", even though the percentage of Albanian residents in the former Yugoslavia was higher than Montenegrins and Macedonians. Statistics from 1981 show that there were over 1.7 million Albanians that lived in the former Yugoslavia, only 570,000 Montenegrins and 1.3 million Macedonians (V. Meier, 1995, p.5). This situation against Kosovo Albanians did not change even after the adoption of the second constitution of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was adopted in 1953. In contrary, a policy aimed at forcing the displacement of Kosovo Albanians to Turkey, was applied (M. Vickers, 1999). In addition, the persecution of Kosovo Albanians by the Serbian state did not stop for ten years, during 1950-1960 ((M. Vickers, 1999).

However, from 1950, the situation for other nations began to improve because the Tito regime became less repressive, political terror disappeared gradually, freedom of expression relatively emerged and a decentralization process was started (P.Garde, 2000.,p.92). But as always, the Kosovo Albanians did not benefit. In this regard, the Tito regime was discriminatory because on one hand it created better conditions for the Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian, Bosnian and Montenegrin nations and, on the other side it did not prevent the crimes against the Albanians in Kosovo committed by the Republic of Serbia. This approach of the Tito regime against Kosovo Albanians was changed only after the bloody events of Kosovo Albanians against the occupation of Serbia. However, it is important to note that prior to these events, some developments had already happened. In 1963, the third constitution was adopted. As noted above, the constitution had changed the name of the Republic by renaming the SFRY, and strengthened the system of decentralization of the country, forming the Chamber of nationalities, federal assembly representing the six republics and two autonomous provinces, etc. This decentralization process was strongly opposed by the Serbian vice-president Aleksandar Rankovic as the two provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) were becoming more autonomous and central government (Serbia) to these provinces was getting weaker. But this Tito's initiative on decentralization became a reality after the entry into force of the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, following protests and ethnic tensions (Serbian, Albanian etc.). In this context, it should be stressed that the protests of the Albanian community in Kosovo, took place only after hundreds of people were imprisoned. There were demonstrations in Kosovo and Serbia as well. Protesters in Kosovo (students) were demonstrating in Prishtina against the tutelage of Serbia. They wanted more autonomous rights, and to be better represented at the federal level, as by the numerical order they were the third nation in the federation (B.Feron, 1993, p.84). However, the Serb students, in Belgrade, were protesting against the negative effects of economic reforms and wanted more economic-social rights. In 1971, there were also claims by the Croatians for greater autonomy for Croatia.

Seeing this situation, Tito did not lose time to adopt the fourth Constitution of the former Yugoslavia in 1974, taking into account some demands of protesters especially those of Croatians and Albanians. The 1974 Constitution had given the republics their cultural autonomy and the right of secession, while a substantial autonomy was given to the two provinces as well. Indeed, the 1974 Constitution had guaranteed them the same constitutional status as the republics as they had become the seventh and eighth component of the Federation. The two provinces had the right to representation in all federal institutions. They also had strong elements of the state that were similar to those of republics, for example each of these autonomous provinces had their own institutions (Assemblies, Executive Council, Central banks, Policies), their judicial systems and educational systems, their own constitutions and laws. They also had their territories with borders that could not be changed without their consent. In addition, this constitution guaranteed for the first time, the Albanian language as an official language in Kosovo. This is considered a great 'favour' for Kosovo Albanians even if that right belonged to them, given the fact that they were the majority (over 90%) of people of Kosovo (A. Ducellier, 2006). However, this constitution at the same time was also discriminatory with respect to the Kosovo Albanians because it recognized as a nation only the Bosnian Muslims and Macedonia, but not the Kosovo Albanians.

It can conclude that under the regime of Tito, there have been efforts on establishing equality between the people of the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Albanians were discriminated again by the current constitution and torture of the Serbian state against them continued. However, after the death of Tito (1980), the degree of discrimination and torture against the Kosovo Albanian by the Serbian state considerably increased. Milosevic became the leader of former Yugoslavia with the sole

purpose of reviving the plan of "Greater Serbia". A Greater Serbia that was planned to be composed of Serbia, the two provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina), a large part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia (R.Short, 2009). And surely, Croatia should be the final destination. And it is this plan that brought the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which dissolution caused a huge loss of people's lives and economic losses. The next part will focus on the process of dissolution of the SFRY and the terrible consequences that this dissolution provided for the population of the SFRY.

### **3. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH EU**

By analysing the process of dissolution of the SFRY and its consequences, this part of the article will confirm the hypothesis that the EU's mission to erase hostilities between people through the integration and cooperation is still alive even today. Particularly, this applies in the case of Kosovo, which has been the victim of torture committed by the Serbian government for tens of centuries (B.Feron, 1993, p.59).

#### **3.1. The dissolution of former Yugoslavia**

First of all, it must be stressed that Kosovo Albanians were discriminated economically as well. After Tito's death in May 1980 and during the 1980-1992 years, the economic crisis had driven the entire region of the former Yugoslavia. The economy of the former Yugoslavia was dependent on international debts, debts which increasingly expanded. Thus, they increased from 6 billion dollars which were in 1975 to \$ 19 billion in early 1980 (I.Rama, 2006). It is important to note also that the inflation rate increased to 25% only during the year 1989 (L.Lyon, 1996). However, since there were a lot of economic inequalities between regions of Yugoslavia, the crisis hit the poorest regions more than the rich regions, as was the case with Kosovo.

In fact, despite the fact that Kosovo had, and still has, a considerable amount of mineral wealth (large amounts of lignite resources and in smaller quantity of gold, silver, copper), it was one of the poorest regions of the former Yugoslavia because of the discriminatory policy of the Serbian regime. This economic injustice has been well described by Féron with a simple sentence: "There are five centuries of distance between Kosovo and Slovenia" (B.Feron, 1993,p.59). This is also the absurdity that encouraged the protests of Kosovo Albanians in 1981.

Thus, Kosovo Albanian students and workers found in such a miserable/unfair situation and without hope for their future, were organized on peaceful demonstrations on 11 March 1981 by revoking their social, economic (to have better supply, improvement of food, etc.) and political rights (the Kosovo de jure establishment as the seventh republic of Yugoslavia). This event made the first serious crisis after the death of Tito. They were described by the Serb leadership against revolutionaries. Brutal repression against Kosovo Albanians was used. There were thousands of Albanians imprisoned even four years after the first manifestations. The Serbian security structures condemned about 4000 Albanians and more than 1000 Albanians were killed, among them 63 were Albanian soldiers in the Yugoslav army (N. Malcome, 1998, p.335). Following these events, every third Kosovo Albanian was abused by the Serbian police, while in 1990 there were 7000 students poisoned, mostly female (N. Malcome, 1998). This brutal repression against Kosovo Albanians, carried by Serbian nationalists led by Milosevic, was followed by the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 (S. Kllloqji, B. Ahmeti, G. Konjufca, V. Murati, 2007).

In this context, it should be noted that the autonomy of Vojvodina was also suppressed by Milosevic. But the expansionist appetites of Serbian nationalism did not stop here. Milosevic, with different groups of Serb activists in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia began to organize tours in these regions to provoke reactions by Croatians and Bosnians. These tours demonstrated that Milosevic had territorial ambitions and wanted to control the territories of Croatia and BiH populated with Serbian majority. We should articulate the fact that all these expansionary initiatives led by Milosevic (tours in Croatia and BiH, the brutal crackdown against the Kosovo Albanian and the suppression of the autonomy of both provinces), were part of Milosevic's plan to create "Greater Serbia" based in the memorandum of the Academy of Arts and Sciences of Serbia (SANU). This memorandum was aimed at ethnic cleaning in all the Yugoslav regions where there were Serbian people as well. However, in the case of Kosovo, there was also another memorandum entitled

"Expulsion of the Albanians", which was run by Milosevic in 1991 (Vasa Čubrilović, 1973). And rightly, the actions undertaken by Milosevic to implement the memorandum against the Kosovo Albanians were compared with the means / plans used by the Nazis to incorporate the Germans to the Reich (R. Lukic, 2003).

Being frustrated by all these initiatives and unilateral actions of the Milosevic (mainly by eliminating by force the autonomy of both provinces) and the Serbian domination, Slovenia and Croatia form their non-communist parties in 1990. A year later, June 25, 1991, they also declared their independence. But the federal army, controlled by Serbs, immediately after these declarations of their independence, entered into the territories of Slovenia and Croatia. In the case of Slovenia, an EU intervention to negotiate a "fragile peace" had its success. Although in the case of Croatia, fractions between Croatian and Serb forces in the territories inhabited by Serb majority (the Krajina region) were extended and resulted in 18,000 confirmed dead at the end of the year 1991 (1448 of which were soldiers killed in combat, and more than 14,000 were injured, 14,000 people are missing (presumed dead), more than 703,300 refugees and the demolition of 100,000 homes - over a third of Croatia's economy was destroyed and damaged (S. Gabriel-Mestrovic, 1996).

Seeing what happened to their neighbours and how they acted, Macedonia and BiH were quick to take similar measures by declaring their independence as well. Macedonia declared its independence in September 1991 while BiH in October 1991 (K. Dawisha, B. Parrott, 1997; D. U. Eralp, 2010). The declaration of the independence of these two republics, especially the one of the Republic of BiH, was a shock for Serbia. Although in the case of Macedonia there was no conflict with Serb forces (being the only country of the former Yugoslavia to gain independence through peace) in the territory of BiH, terror and genocide by Serb forces started against Bosnian Muslims. At this time, in January 1992, when the United Nations (UN) sent its peacekeepers in Croatia in order to maintain a fragile peace, Serbia occupied 65% of the territory of BiH and proclaimed the Serbian Republic of BiH. For a very short time, the humanitarian catastrophe happened in BiH. According to Jose Maria Mendiluce, the Special Envoy of High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the humanitarian disaster was the worst refugee crisis and the most terrible slaughter known in Europe since the Second World War (Rapport HRC N0.9, 2000). There were 7000 men and young people, almost all Muslims, who were murdered by Serbian forces. According to the report, after four years of war, almost half of the population of BiH, 4.4 million citizens) was displaced: 1.3 million internally displaced, around 500,000 refugees in neighboring countries (Rapport HRC N0.9, 2000), nearly 300 000 deaths and some thousands of wounded, with 80% of homes destroyed (A. Nordmann, 1997).

These figures and this situation in BiH were better described by one of the functionaries of HCHR. He said that he had never seen such atrocities since he worked (10 years) with the UNHCHR in different countries (B.Feron, 1993, p.112). But from the beginning, one thing was sure, the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in BiH will be more difficult, as the composition of the people was well mixed (Bekim Çollaku, 2003, p.10). According to the latest 1991 census, Muslims accounted for 43.7% of the 4.36 million inhabitants of the Republic, Serbs 31.4% and 17.3% Croats. Some 5.5% declared themselves ethnic "Yugoslavs" (in total, there were about 2.28 million ethnic Muslims living in Yugoslavia, of which 1.91 million lived in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Although this fact was known to the international community, their reaction to these genocidal atrocities came only after 5 years. As Joschka Fischer said, the international community (especially NATO) instead of intervening, it simply watched in horror the beginning of the war in BiH (ERB, Scott, 2003). In any case, the international Community although with a delay of 5 years, managed to end the terror by offering a peace agreement to the parties involved in the war (Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs). This agreement was called "The Dayton Peace Agreement" that was achieved in 1995 and signed between the Republic of BiH, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

In this context, we must mention one another inattention of the international community, and why it cannot be forgiven. The international community did not only react with delay in the case of BiH, but it did not even think to settle the security situation in the entire region of the former Yugoslavia, on the occasion of the completion of the Dayton agreement. It had excluded the Kosovo issue from this agreement despite the request made by Kosovo Albanian leaders at the time. This agreement generates other questions: the question of succession of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the creation of the federal state of Serbia and Montenegro (FRY), who claimed to be the sole successor of SFRY. However, the exclusion of Kosovo Albanians of the Dayton Agreement brought

terrible consequences for the people of Kosovo, and of course, this allowed the repetition of genocide of BiH in Kosovo.

In reality, the Dayton Agreement was the last hope for the Kosovo Albanians that their political status will be resolved peacefully. Thus, the exclusion of Kosovo Albanian from this agreement showed the Kosovo leaders that if they want to sit at the negotiating table to resolve their political status, one must first have a sufficient capital on military grounds (R. Lukic, 2003, p.316). Having noted this, Kosovo Albanians tired of the peaceful Kosovo representatives were convinced that passive resistance against the terrorist regime of the state of Serbia for centuries has not resolved and will not solve their political status. As we see, they were forced to replace their passive resistance to active resistance. In 1996, the Albanian created their military capacity named the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK - in Albanian). Their first press release was published by a political representative of the KLA, Mr. Xhavit Haliti (Radio Televizioni i Kosoves, Avril 2009). The KLA was supported by the Albanian public radically because its first goal was the protection of the Albanian civilian population in Kosovo from the Serbian regime and its policy of ethnic cleansing (as mentioned above the principal goal of Milosevic was cleansing Kosovo of its Albanian population).

To argue this conclusion, it suffices to mention just a few statistics for the year 1998. The KLA had a few thousand men in the summer of 1998, while the Milosevic regime had deployed more than 30,000 Serbian police officers and militaries in the territory of Kosovo. In addition, there were about 800 000 Albanians that were either become internally displaced persons or refugees (in Europe or the countries of neighbourhoods) only in the autumn of 1998 (Rapport d'OHCHR, No.116, 1996). In reality, these statistics show that the principal objective of the Milosevic regime in Kosovo was not the fight against the KLA but emptying Kosovo of its Albanian inhabitants. This becomes even more striking when one adds other statistics about the terror experienced by Kosovo Albanians during the war. The terror committed by Milosevic during the Kosovo war, led to the deaths of 11 000 Albanians , many children, women and elderly people, were killed and many buried in mass graves (Y. Jaka, 2002, p.67-68). Approximately half a million Albanians left Kosovo for one year, from 1989 to 1999 to settle in different countries of Western Europe and America. Meanwhile, nearly 3,000 people are still missing, while 2,000 others were taken to prisons in Serbia during the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo (Y. Jaka, 2002, p.67-68). In this context it should be mentioned that the event which had attracted the attention of the international community for the first time, was the tragedy of the village of Prekaz, where 51 people from the same family were killed and massacred in March 1998 (Y. Jaka, 2002, p.67-68). It was only at this time that the international community became committed to seriously address the issue of Kosovo. Therefore, on 9 March 1998, at the request of France and Great Britain, the Contact Group met in London to discuss for the first time on the status of Kosovo (R. Lukic, 2003, p.325).

The tragedies that happened during the following months of the same year (26 and 27 September 1998) and which also appealed the attention of NATO, were two other massacres in the Drenica Valley (which is located in the central part of Kosovo). In the first massacre there were fourteen dead, while in the second there were eighteen Albanian (ten women, four children and a baby, who were found murdered) in village Obrije/Drenica (Official Documents nr. 1). In June 1998, NATO sent some of its planes over Albania and the Republic of Macedonia, to show to Milosevic that an air strike over the FRY can happen. Given that this act of NATO and diplomatic efforts of the international community had no effect on Milosevic, on 24 March 1999, NATO planes began to bomb targets in the FRY. These bombings led to withdrawal of police and paramilitaries from Kosovo to return to Serbia. After 78 days of bombing, Kosovo was put under the control of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for a period of 9 years. After a long process of negotiations with Serbia under the leadership of the international community after the failure to find a compromise, the elected representatives of the Kosovar people declared the independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. From that moment the Kosovo independence was recognize by over 100 countries (until the end of October 2013) of which 23 of them are EU Member States. The number of recognitions of Kosovo's independence is gradually increasing even if Serbia is still trying to block this process.

All these events and findings on the former Yugoslavia, lead us to two conclusions:

1. the saying that "the Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo, and it will end in Kosovo", appeared to be true (N. Malcom, 1998), since the declaration of independence of Kosovo has ended all the stories concerning the Yugoslav criminal "dynasty";

2. there is a long animosity between the countries and people of the former Yugoslavia, especially between Serbs and Albanians.

So, the best way to turn off this hostility and bring long-term peace between them is their integration into the EU. Today, the EU has already guaranteed a European perspective for all countries of the former Yugoslavia (the Western Balkan countries), but the stage of completion of this process differs from one country to another. Some of them are more advanced in this process, and some less. A detailed analysis of this process will be made in my next article, but for the purpose of present article it is necessary to explain how the relations between the EU (then the European Community) and the former Yugoslavia were developed during this period of the former Yugoslavia.

### 3.2. Relations between the former Yugoslavia and the EU

Relations between the EU (then EEC) and the former Yugoslavia began from the time of Tito. At the beginning, they developed their relations on economic areas. The first contractual relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the SFRY began in 1970 with the signing of the first cooperation agreement, and that the same was replaced later by the second 1973 agreement - a non-preferential agreement (MEMO/87/136). As the 1973 agreement included a review clause allowing the development of economic cooperation, and the ability to realize these activities of development of cooperation in the framework of a new agreement. Negotiations for a new agreement had begun in 1978, which became successful with the signing of a new agreement in April 1980. It is from these years that the former Yugoslavia became the third Balkan country to start special cooperative relations with the EEC (Journal officiel L /30 du 27 mai 1980; R. Yakemtchouk, 2005 ; A.Kotios, 2001., p.96).

This agreement was more special as it was for an indefinite period and included provisions on trade, financial assistance and cooperation in the fields of industry, science and technology, energy, agriculture, transport, environment and tourism. To implement all these measures, there have been a lot of agreements and protocols in place. There was even concrete and substantial cooperation for the implementation of certain industrial, social and financial provisions. The best examples were:

1. the opening of a "Business Cooperation Centre" which drew the Yugoslav firms with ECE firms;
2. access of the former Yugoslavia to the European Investment Bank resources (during 1980-1991, the Bank had granted a loan to Yugoslavia of a total of 1,310 Million ECU);
3. the possibility that the Yugoslav workers benefit from a guarantee of non-discrimination in terms of jobs.

In addition, the former Yugoslavia was also the second commercial Mediterranean partner and the first partner for industrial products of the EEC (in the first quarter of 1987).

This cooperation between the EEC and the former Yugoslavia, particularly their commercial cooperation, were key factors for the EU's participation and its countries in the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and especially in the Kosovo war (A. Kotios, 2001., p.197). In this context, it is important to scan the pattern of trade between them during the years 1979-1987:

**Figure 2:** The exchange structure between EEC and former Yugoslavia during 1979-1987.

Exchange EEC / Yugoslavia									
	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987(*)
Import CE	1966	2040	2211	2767	3530	4310	4783	4893	2110
Export CE	4411	4131	4360	4277	4554	5048	5834	5853	2120
Balance	2445	2091	2149	1510	1024	738	1051	960	10
(*) 5 month									

Source: Eurostat is the official site of the European Commission: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-87-136\\_fr.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-87-136_fr.htm) (Consulted in 2016).

So, we can conclude that Serbia has taken pretty much advantage of these relations, if not more than most countries of the former Yugoslavia. For example, before the war, it achieved to be the third in its

foreign trade with the EEC, and the third with the countries of the East. Thanks to these relations with the EEC, Yugoslavia became as one of the richest economies in the region (the Balkans) during that period of time. However, the economic situation began to change when Milosevic came into power - leader of Yugoslavia. The economic situation became even smaller when the EC decided to put an embargo against the former Yugoslavia. After the embargo, Serbia had problems in selling its products - especially its textiles and obtaining the oil (B. Feron, 1993, p.109).

However, the Serbian economy and the former Yugoslavia went through rapid economic decline and widespread social unrest, especially when the civil war began. The beginning of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia was also one of the main factors for the change of relations between the European Community (EC) and the former Yugoslavia (even if the initial position of the EC for the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not favourable). First, the twelve EU countries recognized immediately the independence of most of republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1992 (R. Yakemtchouk, 2005., p. 319). Second, it also imposed economic sanctions and the trade embargo in 1992 and other sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after the United Nations Security Council decided on economic sanctions and an embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Documents 2). After the imposition of the embargo and the war in Kosovo, the EU started to change its policy towards the countries of the former Yugoslavia dramatically.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

As it is described above, the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo are almost the same as relationship between France and Germany before the EU was established. Current relationship between Kosovo and Serbia are developed as much as EU has committed itself meaning that the integration to the EU is the only incentive for those two countries to advance their relationship and to eliminate the hostilities between them. In this context it should be mentioned that the single most important political development has been in Kosovo's relationship with EU and Serbia. Kosovo signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with EU on 27 October 2015. It is considered as a definite milestone on Kosovo's path towards becoming a member of EU. The SAA constitutes the first contractual relationship between the EU and Kosovo. Indeed, all the agreements that are signed between Kosovo and Serbia so far are signed with the mediation of EU and the SAA is one of the incentives for Kosovo to improve such relationship.

So, the historical mission of the EU to eliminate the hostilities between countries is through economic cooperation and EU Integration.

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